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Social condition  is commonly the result of circumstances,  sometimes
of laws,  oftener  still of these two  causes united;  but when  once  estab-
lished, it may justly be considered  as itself the source  of almost  all the
laws, the  usages,  and the  ideas which  regulate  the  conduct of nations:
whatever  it  does  not  produce,  it  modifies.  If  we  would  become  ac-
quainted  with  the legislation  and  the  manners  of  a  nation,  therefore,
we must begin by the study of its social condition.
..  The  socal  condition  of the Americans  is  eminently  democratic;
this was  its character  at the  foundation  of the  colonies,  and  it  is  still
more  strongly  marked  at  the  present  day.  . . . Great  equality  existed
among  the  emigrants  who  settled  on  the  shores  of  New  England.
Even  the germs  of  aristocracy  were  never  planted  in  that part  of  the
Union.  The only  influence  which  obtained  there  was  that of intellect.
Alexis  de Tocqueville  traveled in this country  for nine  months  in
1831  and  1832,  and  published  his  great  commentary  in  1835.  His
description  of America's  "social  condition"  above  was  followed  by  a
prediction later in the volume:
The  time  will  . . . come,  when  one  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of
men  will  be  living  in North  America,  equal  in condition,  all  belong-
ing to one family, owing their origin to the same  cause,  and preserving
the  same  civilization,  the  same  language,  the  same  religion,  the  same
habits,  the  same  manners,  and  imbued with the  same  opinions,  propa-
gated under the same forms.
His  prediction  was  not  entirely  accurate!  But  America,  in  de
Tocqueville's  eyes, was  a  democracy  and  destined  to develop  as  one.
It  also  is clear  that  the essence  of democracy  to him was  equality.
How often  we have read the  great American  declaration  that  "all
men  are  created  equal"!  How  often,  too,  a  mental  rebuttal  has  in-
truded  to  question  whether  we  really  meant  it  or  not.  Even  as  we
declared  in  1776  for equality,  did we  not  own  black  men  as  slaves?
And are  not some  people simply  superior to others?  Did we  mean it?
And, if so, how did we mean it?
Professor Rossiter  (in Goals for America, '74) has a contemporary
summary  of  what  the  word  "democracy"  in  America  has  come  to
mean:
Democracy,  let  us  remember,  has  a  fundamental  commitment  to
7equality,  in the best and most realistic  senses  of that word; to equality
before  the  law,  equality  of  political  voice,  equality  in  constitutional
rights,  equality of opportunity,  and equality  of consideration.
This is  a pretty fair summary  of how we do mean it in the Ameri-
can society.
But de Tocqueville  asserts a special effect of the concept  of equal-
ity in this passage:
Equality  suggests  to  the  human  mind  several  ideas  which  would
not  have  originated  from  any  other  source.  ...  I  take  as an  example
the  idea  of  human  perfectibility,  because  it  is  one  of  the  principal
notions  that  the  intellect  can  conceive,  and  because  it  constitutes  of
itself  a  great  philosophical  theory,  which  is  everywhere  to be  traced
by  its  consequences  in  the  conduct  of  human  affairs.  . . . The  idea
of  perfectibility  is  therefore  as  old  as  the  world;  equality  did  not
give  birth to it,  but has imparted  to it a  new character.
This  "new  character"  is  that  human  improvement  is  not  circum-
scribed by the limits assigned to it by the aristocrats:
Aristocratic  nations  are  naturally  too  apt  to  narrow  the  scope  of
human perfectibility;  democratic  nations,  to  expand  it  beyond  reason.
Findings  of the  scholar  J.  B.  Bury  do not  agree  with  de  Tocque-
ville's  inferences  that  man  has  always  conceived  of  "progress"  as
such.  Indeed,  according  to Bury,  man  for  many centuries-until  the
sixteenth,  in  fact-had  not  thought  much  at  all  about  progress.
Change  in human affairs occurred  so slowly  that  a single  lifetime  saw
virtually  none.  Furthermore,  after  the  periods  of  greatest  glory  in
Greece and  in Rome,  how  could man  again attain  even  as  much?  By
1830 the world of de Tocqueville  was changing within  the observable
experience of an individual  life, and men were  able to discern achieve-
ments and possibilities deserving of the term, progress.
The  concept  of  equality,  according  to  the  brilliant  Frenchman,
gives birth to progress in this fashion:
In proportion as  castes  disappear  and the  classes  of society approxi-
mate,-as  manners,  customs,  and  laws  vary,  from  the  tumultuous  in-
tercourse  of men,-as new  facts  arise,-  as new truths  are brought  to
light,-as  ancient opinions  are  dissipated,  and  others  take  their  place,
-the  image  of  an  ideal  but  always  fugitive  perfection  presents  itself
to the human mind.
Thus the individual
tends  unceasingly  towards  that  unmeasured  greatness  so  indistinctly
visible  at  the end  of the long  track which  humanity  has  yet to tread.
But some, of course, fear democracy,  distrust not only its premises
but also  its  processes  and  its  sequences.  Liberty,  too,  as  an  accom-
8paniment  to equality  (and it  is  a  very necessary  companion),  is  dis-
trusted in many  places at home  and abroad.  Whatever  reasoning is  at
the base of the distrust, be it aristocratic thinking,  authoritarian  think-
ing,  or honest  intellectual  conviction,  the  forces  of  democracy  and
equalitarianism  are  strong  in  the  contemporary  world.  Even  where
temporarily  set back, they will continuously exert their pressure against
the  limitations  on man,  be  the  limits  philosophical,  legal,  or  institu-
tional.  It  is  the  institutional  system  that takes  our  attention  here.
De Tocqueville  (in the initial quotation I used)  viewed the "social
condition"  when  once  established  as  itself  "the  source  of  almost  all
the  laws, the  usages,  and  the  ideas  . . ." His  observations  imply, too,
that social institutions  spring from  the social  condition and  that  some
of these  institutions  react then to change  the conditions.  The  interac-
tion proceeds  constantly.  Notably  this  is  true  of  the  system  of  edu-
cation.
Plato  was  so  aware  of  the  influence  of  education  on  the  social
condition  that he  dreamed  up an ideal  system  of universal  education
to  produce  the  kind  of citizen  who in  turn would  make  possible  the
ideal Greek city-state.  He would begin,  however,  by "sending  out into
the country all the inhabitants  of the city who are  more than ten years
old,  and by  taking possession  of  the children,  who  will  thus  be  pro-
tected  from the  habits  of their parents."  He would  then provide  each
child  with  full  equality  of  educational  opportunity,  not  knowing
where  talent  might break  out.  But  we note  that  Plato  felt before  his
educational  scheme  could  succeed,  the  social  condition  would  have
to be changed by getting rid of everybody  over age  ten.
Plato  was  a philosopher  and  philosophers  are permitted  any pro-
posals!  The practical world, however,  cannot be dismissed.  We  cannot
dismiss  everybody  ten years  old  and  above!  Indeed,  no  matter  what
ideals we  hold for  our society's  ultimate  attainment,  we  begin  always
where  we are-with  the  facts.  And  among  the facts  we  must  reckon
with  are  our  sense  of  purpose  and  our  conception  of  our  society.
Conception and purpose condition our collective thinking  and become
factors  in determining  the  efforts  we  make  as  a  people-their  direc-
tion, their substance,  and the results.
For even  though  we must  take  into account  the  vast  educational
development-or  lack  of  it-which  takes  place  outside  the  formal
institutional  structure  provided  explicitly  by  society,  what  we  are
obliged  to consider  here today  is the latter.  Our  concept  of ourselves
as  a people may  differ from that  of India  or of  Ghana or Brazil.  In-
deed,  some  national  societies  may  be  almost  totally  lacking  a  philo-
sophical  concept  of  purpose.  Whatever  the  philosophy,  however,  it
sets the course of the formal educational system.
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purpose in the introductory  sentences of the Eisenhower Report of the
Commission on National Goals  (1960):
The paramount  goal  of the  United States  was  set  long  ago.  It is  to
guard  the  rights  of the  individual,  to ensure  his  development,  and  to
enlarge  his opportunity.
The Commission adds:
The status  of the  individual  must remain  our primary  concern.  All
our  institutions-political,  social,  and  economic-must  further  en-
hance  the  dignity  of  the  citizen,  promote  the  maximum  development
of his  capabilities,  stimulate  their responsible  exercise,  and  widen  the
range  and effectiveness  of opportunities  for individual  choice.
Then follows  a report with supporting essays,  which are  infused in
every  page  with  the  role  of  education  in removing  barriers,  opening
doors,  and  exploiting  the  vast  potential  of  knowledge  for  human
growth  and  betterment.  It  is  a  marvelous  statement  of  our  central
concept.
So  our  educational  system  is  not  lacking  a  conceptual  context.
What  it  may be  lacking  in  any  one  state  or  region  or  in  the  nation
as a whole is a conviction of priority on two levels.
One level: What priority  within  the  total boundaries  of  economic
possibility must  we give education,  as  opposed  to transportation,  rec-
reation,  space  exploration,  and  national  defense,  to  cite  a  few  com-
petitors?
A  second level: Within  the  system,  what priority  do  we  give,  for
example,  the expansion  and  improvement  of  preschool  education  as
an  equalizer  of  opportunity-to  provide,  indeed,  (Eldon  Johnson)
"opportunity  for  equality"  for  culturally  deprived  children-as
against,  on  the  other  hand,  expanding  and  improving  vocational-
technical  education,  or  advanced  graduate  study  in  the  sciences  and
technology, or the liberal arts at the college level.
Further,  we  are confronted with  deciding  the priorities  of purpose
-economic  development  as against  social  and  aesthetic  enrichment
of our daily  lives.
And  within  those  decisions  are  many  more.  Do  we  succumb  or
not to what Ortega y Gasset called "the barbarism of 'specialisation,'"
a product in his judgment of education by mass-man?
In our prodigious  efforts  to have  education  serve  the  democratic
purpose,  will we  have  the  wisdom to permit-even  assist-a  creative
elite to emerge and, as Toynbee  said  of geniuses,  "leaven the lump  of
ordinary humanity"?
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society must be the "self-renewing"  society, using  John Gardner's  now
well-known  phrase?  Do we understand  that education  itself  will serve
-or  can disserve-this  purpose,  depending  on the what  and  how  of
its effort.
Finally,  do  we  see clearly  enough  the  indispensable  role  of  free-
dom  as the condition sine qua non of democracy at its  best and  of an
education which has the chance  to produce  democracy?
I raise  this  last point  about freedom  in order  to  qualify  explicitly
my own interest and  yours in  education  to  serve  economic  growth-
economic  ends.  The  need to  see clearly  human beings  as  a  resource,
even  what  we  call  "the  basic  resource,"  is  important.  Only  a  few
days ago  I spoke to  a business group  on this  very thesis,  urging  upon
them  the  economic  necessity  of  developing  certain  kinds  of  man-
power. The point indeed was a valid one,  in which I believe.  But even
as I spoke, and shall do again,  I reminded  myself that education  must
be  "investment  in  man"-to  use  the  preferred  phrase  of  Sir  Eric
Ashby-and  that man  is  vastly  more  than  an  economic  investment.
Surely  this  is  the  major  difference  in  the  materialistic view  of  man,
which  finds  considerable  acceptance,  even  dominance,  in  the  Soviet
society,  and  the  whole  view  of  man  which  is  the  special  devotion
of a  free,  democratic  society.  Which  brings  me  to  a quick  flashback
to de Tocqueville's assertion with which I began:
If we  would  become  acquainted  with  the  legislation  and  the  man-
ners  of  a nation,  therefore,  we  must  begin  by  the  study  of  its  social
condition.
Our condition  includes  the  freedom  to  define  and  redefine  our
goals  in  each  generation  and  freedom  for  each  individual  to  make
choices.  And it includes the persistent goal of equality  of opportunity.
Our  system  of  education,  therefore,  must  serve  the  condition  of
freedom,  the  goal  of  opportunity,  and  the  precious  entity  we  call  a
man-all of him and all of them.
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